Nicolas
cf8ef26f63
Premiere brique de l'app d'admin independante : une surface /admin/*
ajoutee a apps/api, avec une authentification totalement distincte de
celle des utilisateurs.
- Table AdminUser isolee (aucune relation vers UserProfile), migration
20260828120000_admin_user.
- lib/admin-jwt.ts : sign/verify d'un JWT admin, secret ADMIN_JWT_SECRET
propre (jamais interchangeable avec JWT_SECRET).
- middlewares/require-admin.ts : cookie admin_session dedie, re-check
tokenVersion, echoue ferme si ADMIN_JWT_SECRET absent (posture
requireInternalWorker). res.locals.adminUser type via AdminLocals.
- modules/admin/ : admin-auth.{routes,service}.ts (POST /login, POST
/logout, GET /me), admin.routes.ts agregateur monte /admin. Pas de
signup expose.
- lib/safe-admin.ts : mapping AdminUser -> AdminUserView (drop passwordHash
+ tokenVersion, dates ISO).
- scripts/create-admin.ts : creation du 1er admin hors-bande (flags ou
ADMIN_INITIAL_*).
- CORS : setupCore accepte string[] ; app.ts autorise CORS_ORIGIN +
ADMIN_CORS_ORIGIN.
- Shared : schemas/admin.ts (adminLoginSchema), types/admin.ts
(AdminUserView).
- Env : ADMIN_JWT_SECRET (optionnel), ADMIN_COOKIE_NAME, ADMIN_CORS_ORIGIN,
ADMIN_INITIAL_* ; .env.example, .env.test.example, docker-compose.yml,
ci.yml mis a jour.
- reset-db.ts truncate admin_users.
- Tests Mocha admin-auth.test.ts : 400 sans body, 401 email inconnu /
mauvais mdp, login OK (cookie pose, lastLoginAt, pas de hash/tokenVersion
dans la reponse), /me derriere requireAdmin, logout, et un cookie
`session` d'utilisateur normal ne donne pas acces a /admin/*.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
64 lines
3.2 KiB
Text
64 lines
3.2 KiB
Text
# Used by docker-compose.yml to provision the local Postgres container.
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# Pick your own values — do not reuse these across environments, and never
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# commit the real .env (it's git-ignored).
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POSTGRES_USER=changeme
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=changeme
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POSTGRES_DB=batchcooking
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POSTGRES_PORT=5432
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# Used by docker-compose.yml's "app" service (Docker-only — the native
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# `pnpm dev:api` workflow reads apps/api/.env instead, set both when using
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# both workflows). Required, no default on purpose — generate your own.
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JWT_SECRET=changeme-generate-a-real-random-secret-at-least-32-chars
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# Optional — host port for the Docker review stack's single app container
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# (docker-compose.yml), serving both the API and the built frontend.
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# APP_PORT=3000
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# --- Admin application (apps/admin-web + the /admin/* API surface) ---------
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# All optional: an instance that doesn't run the admin app needs none of
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# these. `requireAdmin` fails closed when ADMIN_JWT_SECRET is unset, so
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# leaving it out simply disables every /admin/* route.
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#
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# Secret for the admin session JWT — MUST be different from JWT_SECRET so an
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# end-user token can never be replayed against /admin/*. Generate your own
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# the same way as JWT_SECRET above.
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# ADMIN_JWT_SECRET=changeme-generate-a-real-random-secret-at-least-32-chars
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# Origin apps/admin-web is served from, added to the CORS allow-list.
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# ADMIN_CORS_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5174
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# Host port for the Docker `admin-web` service (static nginx serving the
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# built admin frontend).
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# ADMIN_WEB_PORT=3001
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# Optional — read only by `src/scripts/create-admin.ts` when its --email /
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# --password / --name flags are omitted (e.g. to bootstrap the first admin
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# from inside the container). Never read by the running server.
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# ADMIN_INITIAL_EMAIL=ops@example.com
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# ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD=changeme-at-least-8-chars
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# ADMIN_INITIAL_NAME=Ops
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# Optional — only set this to false if THIS deployment is served over
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# plain HTTP (no TLS in front of it). Left unset, the session cookie
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# requires HTTPS (Secure attribute) as it should for a real deployment;
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# over plain HTTP a Secure cookie is silently never sent back by the
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# browser, so login "succeeds" but every subsequent request 401s.
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# COOKIE_SECURE=false
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# Required — secret shared between "app" and "tech-step-intent-service"
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# (docker-compose.yml, apps/api/src/config/env.ts). Unlike
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# INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET below, there's no "leave it unset" escape hatch:
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# tech-step-intent-service is a core dependency, not an optional background
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# job — without it, no recipe step can have its techniques detected at all.
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# Generate your own the same way as JWT_SECRET above.
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INTENT_SERVICE_SECRET=changeme-generate-a-real-random-secret-at-least-32-chars
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# Only needed to run the optional `tech-step-llm-worker` service — shared
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# between it and "app" (docker-compose.yml). Generate your own the same
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# way as JWT_SECRET above; leave both this and the service commented
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# out/unset to run without it.
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# INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET=changeme-generate-a-real-random-secret-at-least-32-chars
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# Optional — cron expression (node-cron syntax) the worker wakes up on to
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# run its audit/feedback-loop jobs. Default: weekly, Sunday 03:00 — a
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# provisional floor, not a calibrated value (see
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# services/tech-step-llm-worker/README.md).
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# TECH_STEP_WORKER_CRON=0 3 * * 0
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