batchCooking/docker-compose.yml
Nicolas cf8ef26f63
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feat(admin): fondation auth de l'application d'administration
Premiere brique de l'app d'admin independante : une surface /admin/*
ajoutee a apps/api, avec une authentification totalement distincte de
celle des utilisateurs.

- Table AdminUser isolee (aucune relation vers UserProfile), migration
  20260828120000_admin_user.
- lib/admin-jwt.ts : sign/verify d'un JWT admin, secret ADMIN_JWT_SECRET
  propre (jamais interchangeable avec JWT_SECRET).
- middlewares/require-admin.ts : cookie admin_session dedie, re-check
  tokenVersion, echoue ferme si ADMIN_JWT_SECRET absent (posture
  requireInternalWorker). res.locals.adminUser type via AdminLocals.
- modules/admin/ : admin-auth.{routes,service}.ts (POST /login, POST
  /logout, GET /me), admin.routes.ts agregateur monte /admin. Pas de
  signup expose.
- lib/safe-admin.ts : mapping AdminUser -> AdminUserView (drop passwordHash
  + tokenVersion, dates ISO).
- scripts/create-admin.ts : creation du 1er admin hors-bande (flags ou
  ADMIN_INITIAL_*).
- CORS : setupCore accepte string[] ; app.ts autorise CORS_ORIGIN +
  ADMIN_CORS_ORIGIN.
- Shared : schemas/admin.ts (adminLoginSchema), types/admin.ts
  (AdminUserView).
- Env : ADMIN_JWT_SECRET (optionnel), ADMIN_COOKIE_NAME, ADMIN_CORS_ORIGIN,
  ADMIN_INITIAL_* ; .env.example, .env.test.example, docker-compose.yml,
  ci.yml mis a jour.
- reset-db.ts truncate admin_users.
- Tests Mocha admin-auth.test.ts : 400 sans body, 401 email inconnu /
  mauvais mdp, login OK (cookie pose, lastLoginAt, pas de hash/tokenVersion
  dans la reponse), /me derriere requireAdmin, logout, et un cookie
  `session` d'utilisateur normal ne donne pas acces a /admin/*.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-28 12:02:19 +02:00

142 lines
6.7 KiB
YAML

services:
postgres:
image: postgres:16-alpine
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
# No defaults on purpose: POSTGRES_USER/PASSWORD/DB must be set in your
# local, git-ignored .env (see .env.example). Compose fails loudly if
# they're missing instead of falling back to a guessable credential.
POSTGRES_USER: ${POSTGRES_USER:?set POSTGRES_USER in .env}
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?set POSTGRES_PASSWORD in .env}
POSTGRES_DB: ${POSTGRES_DB:?set POSTGRES_DB in .env}
ports:
- "${POSTGRES_PORT:-5432}:5432"
volumes:
- postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U $$POSTGRES_USER"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
# Single service serving both the API and the built frontend (see
# apps/api/Dockerfile) — no separate nginx/web container, no cross-origin
# CORS_ORIGIN to keep in sync between two ports.
app:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: apps/api/Dockerfile
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
NODE_ENV: production
PORT: 3000
# Uses the "postgres" service name, not localhost/POSTGRES_PORT —
# container-to-container traffic stays on the compose network and
# always targets Postgres's internal port (5432).
DATABASE_URL: "postgresql://${POSTGRES_USER:?set POSTGRES_USER in .env}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?set POSTGRES_PASSWORD in .env}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:?set POSTGRES_DB in .env}?schema=public"
JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:?set JWT_SECRET in .env}
# Unset by default (falls back to NODE_ENV === "production", i.e.
# Secure cookie required) — set COOKIE_SECURE=false in .env only if
# this deployment is reachable over plain HTTP (no TLS in front of
# it yet), otherwise the session cookie never comes back and every
# authenticated request 401s despite login succeeding. See its doc
# comment in apps/api/src/config/env.ts.
COOKIE_SECURE: ${COOKIE_SECURE:-}
# Shared with the `tech-step-llm-worker` service below — see
# requireInternalWorker's doc comment
# (apps/api/src/middlewares/require-internal-worker.ts). Unset by
# default: `/internal/tech-steps/*` fails closed rather than open
# for a deployment that doesn't run the worker at all.
INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET: ${INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET:-}
# Admin application (apps/admin-web + /admin/*). Both unset by default:
# `requireAdmin` fails closed without ADMIN_JWT_SECRET, so a stack
# that doesn't run the admin app simply has every /admin/* route 401.
# Must be a *different* secret than JWT_SECRET.
ADMIN_JWT_SECRET: ${ADMIN_JWT_SECRET:-}
# Public origin apps/admin-web is served from, added to the CORS
# allow-list alongside the main app. Defaults to the compose
# `admin-web` service's mapped host port.
ADMIN_CORS_ORIGIN: ${ADMIN_CORS_ORIGIN:-http://localhost:3001}
# Compose network service name, not localhost — same reasoning as
# DATABASE_URL above. Unlike INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET, no `:-` fallback:
# tech-step-intent-service is a core dependency (see its own entry
# below), not an optional background job.
INTENT_SERVICE_BASE_URL: "http://tech-step-intent-service:8000"
INTENT_SERVICE_SECRET: ${INTENT_SERVICE_SECRET:?set INTENT_SERVICE_SECRET in .env}
ports:
- "${APP_PORT:-3000}:3000"
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
tech-step-intent-service:
condition: service_healthy
# spaCy-based NER + intent classification microservice
# (services/tech-step-intent-service) — `app` delegates all tech-step
# detection to it over HTTP (see `IntentServiceClient`,
# apps/api/src/lib/recipe-matching/intent-service-client.ts). Unlike
# `tech-step-llm-worker` below, **not optional**: without it, `app` can no
# longer detect any cooking technique in a recipe step at all. No exposed
# port — reachable only from `app` on the compose network, nothing ever
# calls into it from outside.
tech-step-intent-service:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: services/tech-step-intent-service/Dockerfile
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
INTENT_SERVICE_SECRET: ${INTENT_SERVICE_SECRET:?set INTENT_SERVICE_SECRET in .env}
healthcheck:
# No curl/wget in the python:3.12-slim base image — a one-line Python
# request is the healthcheck for a service that's already guaranteed
# to have Python (see this service's Dockerfile).
test:
[
"CMD",
"python",
"-c",
"import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:8000/health', timeout=2)",
]
interval: 15s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
# This service trains itself from scratch on every start (no model
# ever persisted to disk, see its own README) — `/health` only
# returns 200 once that's done, not just once the base spaCy models
# are loaded. Measured at ~540s (fr) / ~390s (en), ~930s combined,
# against the current ~74-technique corpus — each technique now has
# the *same* number of `utterances` per locale as every other
# (equalized to the corpus's own pre-existing max, 7/5 — see
# `training_data.py`'s own doc comment for why a flat, larger target
# like 20 was tried and reverted) — `start_period` generous enough
# that failing checks during that whole window never count against
# `retries` (which would otherwise flip this container to
# "unhealthy" mid-training, blocking `app`'s own `depends_on:
# condition: service_healthy` indefinitely).
start_period: 1200s
# Deliberately its own image, not built into `app`'s (see
# services/tech-step-llm-worker/Dockerfile's own doc comment) — a
# long-lived process with no exposed port (nothing ever calls *into* it,
# it only ever calls out to `app`). Optional: an `INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET`-
# less deployment can omit this service entirely and `app` still runs
# fine, just without the offline audit/feedback-loop jobs.
tech-step-llm-worker:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: services/tech-step-llm-worker/Dockerfile
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
- app
environment:
API_BASE_URL: "http://app:3000"
INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET: ${INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET:?set INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET in .env to run this service}
TECH_STEP_WORKER_CRON: ${TECH_STEP_WORKER_CRON:-0 3 * * 0}
volumes:
# GGUF weights persist across restarts — see this service's own
# Dockerfile doc comment on its VOLUME declaration.
- tech_step_llm_worker_models:/worker/models
volumes:
postgres_data:
tech_step_llm_worker_models: